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NEW LIFE FOR IMPAIRED WATERS:
REALIZING THE GOAL TO
“RESTORE” THE NATION’S WATERS
UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT
Roger Flynn*
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, commonly known as the Clean
Water Act (CWA), is the primary statute regulating the quality of our nation’s
waters.1 Among the many provisions of the CWA, one of the least understood,
and least implemented, is the requirement to protect waters that do not meet
water quality standards from further pollution—the impaired waters provision.2
That is changing.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently reviewed
this part of the CWA and issued a far-reaching decision interpreting the duties
of federal and state agencies to prevent further pollution of impaired waters.3 In
Friends of Pinto Creek v. United States E.P.A., the court overturned a water quality
discharge permit issued by the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
to a large copper mining project in Arizona.4 The critical issue in the case was
whether a discharge permit could be issued that would add a pollutant to Pinto
Creek, a water body that did not meet the applicable water quality standard for
* Adjunct Professor, University of Colorado School of Law, University of Wyoming College
of Law, teaching courses in natural resources and mineral development law. Mr. Flynn is also the
Director and Managing Attorney of the Western Mining Action Project, a non-proﬁt public interest
law ﬁrm specializing in hard rock mining issues in the West, located in Lyons, Colorado.
1

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006) (originally
enacted as Act of June 30, 1948, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155). The Act has been frequently revised. EPA
v. California ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd. (State Water Res. Control Bd.), 426 U.S. 200, 202
n.2 (1976).
2

33 U.S.C. § 1313(d); see also 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i) (2008).

3

Friends of Pinto Creek v. U.S. E.P.A. (Pinto Creek), 504 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 896 (2009).
4

Id. at 1009.
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that pollutant—in that case, dissolved copper. The court vacated and remanded
the EPA-issued permit on the ground that such a discharge violated the impaired
waters provision of the CWA.5
The Pinto Creek decision generated signiﬁcant controversy among regulated
industries and resulted in a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court by the discharge permit applicant, the Carlota Copper Company.6 Carlota’s
petition for certiorari was supported by six separate amicus briefs to the Supreme
Court.7 The EPA ﬁled a brief in opposition to Carlota’s certiorari petition.8 In
January of 2009, the United States Supreme Court denied, without discussion,
Carlota’s certiorari petition.9
Pinto Creek was the ﬁrst federal appellate court decision to comprehensively
review the CWA’s impaired waters provision, and due to the United States
Supreme Court’s decision not to review the Ninth Circuit’s result, Pinto Creek
has national implications. Impaired waters are a signiﬁcant concern across the
country. According to the EPA, there are 44,023 waters in the United States
that do not comply with minimum water quality standards—i.e., that are
impaired.10 According to the latest EPA National Water Quality Inventory, of the
representative streams and rivers assessed,
44% were reported as impaired or not clean enough to support
their designated uses, such as ﬁshing and swimming. . . .
Pathogens, habitat alterations, and organic enrichment/oxygen

5

Id. at 1011–15.

6

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Carlota Copper Co. v. Friends of Pinto Creek (Carlota), 129
S. Ct. 896 (2008) (No. 07-1524), 2008 WL 2355791 (June 4, 2008).
7
Brief of Amicus Curiae for the Federal Water Quality Coalition in Support of Petition
for Writ of Certiorari, Carlota, 129 S. Ct. 896 (No. 07-1524), 2008 WL 2697355 (July 7, 2008);
Amicus Curiae Brief of Mountain States Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioner, Carlota, 129 S.
Ct. 896 (No. 07-1524), 2008 WL 2697354 (July 7, 2008); Brief of the Arizona Mining Association
et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Carlota, 129 S. Ct. 896 (No. 07-1524), 2008 WL
2682525 (July 3, 2008); Brief of the National Association of Clean Water Agencies et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner Carlota Copper Company, Carlota, 129 S. Ct. 896 (No. 07-1524),
2008 WL 2682526 (July 3, 2008); Brief of Paciﬁc Legal Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner, Carlota, 129 S. Ct. 896 (No. 07-1524), 2008 WL 2676565 (July 2, 2008);
Brief of the National Association of Home Builders et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner
Carlota Copper Company, Carlota, 129 S. Ct. 896 (No. 07-1524), 2008 WL 2676566 (July 2,
2008).
8
Brief for the Federal Respondent in Opposition, Carlota, 129 S. Ct. 896 (2008) (No.
07-1524), 2008 WL 4155605 (Sept. 5, 2008).
9

Carlota, 129 S. Ct. at 896.

U.S. E.P.A., NATIONAL SUMMARY OF IMPAIRED WATERS AND TMDL INFORMATION, http://
iaspub.epa.gov/waters10/attains_nation_cy.control?p_report_type=T (last visited Nov. 5, 2009)
(including waters located in all ﬁfty states, American Samoa, District of Columbia, Guam, Northern
Mariana Islands, and Puerto Rico).
10
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depletion were cited as the leading causes of impairment in rivers
and streams, and top sources of impairment included agricultural
activities, hydrologic modiﬁcations (such as water diversions and
channelization), and unknown/unspeciﬁed sources.11
For the assessed lakes and reservoirs, “64% were reported as impaired and 36%
were fully supporting all assessed uses. Mercury, polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCBs), and nutrients were cited as the leading causes of impairment in lakes.”12
Thus, the implications of Pinto Creek are signiﬁcant, as the decision places
substantial restrictions on the ability of states and the EPA to approve new water
quality discharge permits for discharges into any of these 44,023 waters. This
article will review the impaired waters provision of the CWA and the case law
that has developed over the years interpreting that provision, with a focus on the
Ninth Circuit’s Pinto Creek decision.

I. THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND IMPAIRED WATERS
A. Brief Summary of the Clean Water Act
Recognizing that previous attempts to regulate and control water pollution
had been ineffective, Congress enacted the CWA in 1972.13 Prior to the CWA,
previous federal water pollution laws relied on
water quality standards specifying the acceptable levels of
pollution in a State’s interstate navigable waters as the primary
mechanism . . . for the control of water pollution . . . . This
program based on water quality standards, which were to serve
both to guide performance by polluters and to trigger legal
action to abate pollution, proved ineffective.14
One signiﬁcant problem with this approach was that these pre-1972 laws did not
contain any speciﬁc direction as to how these state water quality standards would
be met.15

11
U.S. E.P.A., NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, 2004 REPORTING
CYCLE, EPA 841-R-08-001 at 1 (Jan. 2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/305b/2004rep
ort/2004_305Breport.pdf.
12

Id. at 2.

13

See State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. at 202.

14

Id.

15

Id. at 203.
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Prior to 1972, Congress attempted to control water
pollution by focusing regulatory efforts on achieving “water
quality standards,” standards set by the states specifying the
tolerable degree of pollution for particular waters. This scheme
had two important ﬂaws. First, the mechanism of enforcement
was cumbersome. Regulators had to work backward from an
overpolluted body of water and determine which entities were
responsible; proving cause and effect was not always easy. Second,
the scheme failed to provide adequate incentives to individual
entities to pollute less; an entity’s dumping pollutants into a
stream was ignored if the stream met the standards. The scheme
focused on “the tolerable effects rather than the preventable
causes” of pollution.16
In 1971, the Senate Committee on Public Works concluded that “the federal water
pollution control program . . . has been inadequate in every vital aspect.”17 As a
result, Congress enacted the CWA Amendments, declaring “the national goal that
the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985.”18
Another lofty goal established by Congress in 1972 was that “water quality which
provides for the protection and propagation of ﬁsh, shellﬁsh, and wildlife and
provides for recreation in and on the water be achieved by July 1, 1983.”19
Although these lofty goals were never achieved, the passage of the CWA was
a “bold and sweeping legislative initiative” protecting water quality across the
country.20 As the United States Supreme Court stated: “It is fair to characterize
the Clean Water Act as watershed legislation. The statute endorsed fundamental
changes in both the purpose and the scope of federal regulation of the Nation’s
waters.”21

16
Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. E.P.A. (NRDC), 915 F.2d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir.1990)
(citing State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. at 200, 202–03).
17

S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 7 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3674.

18

33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (2006); see also Monongahela Power Co. v. Alexander, 809 F.2d
41, 45–46 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (marking the 1972 legislation as “the ascendancy of water-quality
control to the status of a major national priority”); Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 772
F.2d 1043, 1055 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that Congress’s far-reaching statutory goals are based on
“its belief that man and nature are so intimately connected that to signiﬁcantly degrade the waters
of [the United States] threatens not only the ﬁsh, but ultimately man as well”); Natural Res. Def.
Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (stating that the Act was a “dramatic
response to accelerating environmental degradation of rivers, lakes and streams in this country”).
19

33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2).

20

Dubois v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273, 1294 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing U.S. v.
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 721 F.2d 832, 834 (1st Cir. 1983)).
21

Solid Waste Auth. of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs., 531 U.S. 159, 175
(2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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With the passage of the CWA in 1972, Congress shifted the focus from the
health of the receiving waters to the imposition of controls on the pollution being
released into the nation’s waters.22
In 1972, Congress passed the Clean Water Act, which
made important amendments to the water pollution laws. The
amendments placed certain limits on what an individual ﬁrm
could discharge, regardless of whether the stream into which it
was dumping was overpolluted at the time . . . . The Act thus
banned only discharges from point sources. The discharge of
pollutants from nonpoint sources—for example, the runoff of
pesticides from farmlands—was not directly prohibited. The
Act focused on point source polluters presumably because they
could be identiﬁed and regulated more easily than nonpoint
source polluters.23
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has stated: “The
Clean Water Act thus overhauled the regulation of water quality. Direct federal
regulation now focuses on reducing the level of efﬂuent that ﬂows from point
sources.”24 As the United States Supreme Court recognized, the shift to direct
restrictions on discharges facilitated enforcement “by making it unnecessary to
work backward from an over-polluted body of water to determine which point
sources are responsible and which must be abated.”25
The CWA is designed “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”26 The CWA attempts to achieve these
goals through a comprehensive regulatory scheme using permits, technology
controls, and water quality-based pollution controls. The Supreme Court has
outlined the main goals and provisions of the CWA:
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, commonly known as
the Clean Water Act . . . is a comprehensive water quality statute

22

Or. Natural Desert Assoc. v. Dombeck, 172 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 1998).

23

NRDC, 915 F.2d at 1316.

24

Dombeck, 172 F.3d at 1096.

25

State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. at 204.

26

33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). As one appellate court stated:
This objective incorporated a broad, systematic view of the goal of maintaining
and improving water quality: as the House report on the legislation put it, “the
word ‘integrity’ . . . refers to a condition in which the natural structure and function
of ecosystems [are] maintained.” United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,
474 U.S. 121, 132, 106 S. Ct. 455, 462 (1985) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 92-911,
at 76 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3744).

Dubois, 102 F.3d at 1294.
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designed to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” The Act also seeks
to attain “water quality which provides for the protection and
propagation of ﬁsh, shellﬁsh, and wildlife.”
To achieve these ambitious goals, the Clean Water Act
establishes distinct roles for the Federal and State Governments.
Under the Act, the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) is required, among other things, to
establish and enforce technology-based limitations on individual
discharges into the country’s navigable waters from point sources.
Section 303 of the Act also requires each State, subject to federal
approval, to institute comprehensive water quality standards
establishing water quality goals for all intrastate waters. These
state water quality standards provide “a supplementary basis . . .
so that numerous point sources, despite individual compliance
with efﬂuent limitations, may be further regulated to prevent
water quality from falling below acceptable levels.”27
The CWA expressly prohibits all discharges of pollutants from point sources
into navigable waters, unless such discharges are authorized pursuant to a CWA
permit.28 “Pollutants” are deﬁned as “dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator
residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological
materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock,
sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into
water.”29 The term “discharge of any pollutant” is deﬁned as “any addition of
any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.”30 A point source is
deﬁned under the CWA as any “discernable, conﬁned, and discrete conveyance.”31
The CWA regulates point source discharges through the Section 402 National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit program, which
applies to discharges of pollutants, and through the Section 404 permit program
for discharges of dredged and ﬁll materials.32

27

PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 704 (1994)
(citations omitted).
28

33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)(1) (2006).

29

33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2006). The term “pollutant” has been deﬁned broadly. See N. Plains
Res. Council v. Fidelity Exploration & Dev. Co., 325 F.3d 1155, 1160–63 (9th Cir. 2003).
30

33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A); see also Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., 421 F.3d 1133,
1142–46 (10th Cir. 2005) (discussing what constitutes an “addition of a pollutant”).
31

33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). The term point source is also deﬁned broadly. United States v. Earth
Sci., Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 370 (10th Cir. 1979); see also Trustees for Alaska v. E.P.A., 749 F.2d 549,
557–58 (9th Cir. 1984) (adopting Earth Science’s broad interpretation of point source).
32

33 U.S.C. §§ 1342–1344 (2006). The CWA does not directly regulate the discharge of
pollutants from so-called “nonpoint sources.” Dombeck, 172 F.3d at 1097. The Act “provides no
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Although the EPA is the primary agency responsible for administering the
CWA, the CWA allows states to assume the authority for issuing NPDES permits,
upon approval of the state’s permitting program by EPA.33 The EPA also “retains
authority to review operation of a State’s permit program. . . . [and] in addition
to this review authority, after notice and opportunity to take action, the EPA may
withdraw approval of a state permit program which is not being administered in
compliance with [Section] 402.”34

B. The Role of Water Quality Standards and TMDLs in “Restoring and
Maintaining” the Integrity of the Nations’ Waters
Despite Congress’s change in focus from the health of the receiving water
body to the control of efﬂuent from point source discharges into those waters,
the CWA contained signiﬁcant provisions aimed at protecting the nation’s waters,
based on the quality and uses of those waters.
Congress decidedly did not in 1972 give up on the broader goal
of attaining acceptable water quality. Rather, the new statute
recognized that even with the application of the mandated
technological controls on point source discharges, water bodies
still might not meet state-set water quality standards. The 1972
statute therefore put in place mechanisms other than direct
federal regulation of point sources, designed to “restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation’s waters.”35
The primary CWA provision focused on the water bodies themselves is
Section 303, entitled “Water Quality Standards and Implementation Plans.”36
This section establishes water quality standards in cooperation with the states:
“The states are required to set water quality standards for all waters within their
boundaries regardless of the sources of pollution entering the waters.”37 Water
quality standards establish, and then protect, the desired conditions of each

direct mechanism to control nonpoint source pollution but rather uses the ‘threat and promise’ of
federal grants to the states to accomplish this task.” Id. (citations omitted).
33

33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2006); see also Nat’l Assoc. of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife,
551 U.S. 644, 649–55 (2007) (involving the EPA’s delegation of the Section 402 permitting
program to Arizona).
34

State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. at 208 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)).

35

Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted) (emphasis in
original). For a detailed discussion of Pronsolino, see Erin Tobin, Pronsolino v. Nastri: Are TMDLs
For NonPoint Sources the Key to Controlling the ‘Unregulated’ Half of Water Pollution?, 33 ENVTL. L.
807 (2003).
36

33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2006).

37

Pronsolino, 291 F.3d at 1127 (emphasis in original).
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waterway within the state’s regulatory jurisdiction.38 “Water quality standards
are retained as a supplementary basis for efﬂuent limitations, however, so that
numerous point sources, despite individual compliance with efﬂuent limitations,
may be further regulated to prevent water quality from falling below acceptable
levels.”39
Section 303 mandates three speciﬁc components of a state’s water quality
program. First, a state establishes the “designated uses” of its waters.40 Second, a
state promulgates “water quality criteria,” both numeric and narrative, specifying
the water quality conditions, such as maximum pollutant levels, that are necessary
to protect the designated uses.41 Third, a state adopts and implements an
“antidegradation” policy to prevent any further degradation of water quality.42
These three components of a state water quality program are independent and
separately enforceable requirements of federal law.43
States are responsible for the development of water quality standards
applicable to water bodies within their borders.44 A state-developed water quality
standard, however, does not become effective until the EPA approves the standard
or policy.45 If a state does not set water quality standards, or if the EPA determines
that the state standards do not meet the requirements of the CWA and EPA
regulations, then the EPA promulgates standards for the state.46
Water quality standards establish the water quality goals for a waterbody
as a whole.47 They are the benchmarks by which the quality of a waterbody is
measured: waterbodies that do not meet these benchmarks are deemed “water

38

According to the statute:
[A] water quality standard shall consist of the designated uses of the navigable
waters involved and the water quality criteria for such waters based on such uses.
Such standards shall be such as to protect the public health and welfare, enhance
the quality of the water and serve the purposes of this chapter. Such standards
shall be established taking into consideration their use and value for public water
supplies, propagation of ﬁsh and wildlife, recreational purposes, and agricultural,
industrial, and other purposes, and also taking into consideration their use and
value for navigation.

33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A).
39

State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. at 205 n.12. See also PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 704.

40

33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A).

41

Id.

42

33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4)(B); see also 40 C.F.R. § 131.12 (2008).

43

PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 705.

44

33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(1), (3).

45

33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(3); see also 40 C.F.R. § 131.21(c) (2008).

46

Pronsolino, 291 F.3d at 1127 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (b), (c)(3)–(4)).

47

40 C.F.R. § 131.2 (2008).
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quality-limited” or “impaired” and placed on the list for such waters in each state
prepared pursuant to CWA Section 303(d), known as the “303(d) list.”48 Section
303(d) requires that:
Each State shall identify those waters within its boundaries
for which the efﬂuent limitations required by section 1311(b)
(1)(A) and section 1311(b)(1)(B) of this title are not stringent
enough to implement any water quality standard applicable to
such waters. The State shall establish a priority ranking for such
waters, taking into account the severity of the pollution and the
uses to be made of such waters.49
For impaired waters identiﬁed on each state’s 303(d) list, the states must
develop total maximum daily loads (TMDLs) in order to bring these waterbodies
back into compliance with applicable water quality standards.50 According to the
CWA:
Each State shall establish for the waters identiﬁed in paragraph
(1)(A) of this subsection, and in accordance with the priority
ranking, the total maximum daily load, for those pollutants
which the [EPA] Administrator identiﬁes under section 1314(a)
(2) of this title as suitable for such calculation. Such load shall be
established at a level necessary to implement the applicable water
quality standards with seasonal variations and a margin of safety
which takes into account any lack of knowledge concerning the
relationship between efﬂuent limitations and water quality.51

48

33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2006).

49

33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A).

50

33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C). If a state fails to establish a TMDL for an impaired water, the
EPA may do so. Pinto Creek, 504 F.3d at 1010 (noting that the EPA developed the TMDL after the
conservation groups ﬁled their initial administrative appeal of the EPA-issued NPDES permit).
51
33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C). For a series of detailed analysis of the TMDL provisions of
the CWA, see Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs III: A New Framework for the Clean Water Act’s Ambient
Standards Program, 28 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,415 (1998) (analyzing the TMDL
provision of the CWA); Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs: The Resurrection of Water Quality StandardsBased Regulation Under the Clean Water Act, 27 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,327 (1997)
(analyzing the TMDL provision of the CWA); Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs, Are We There Yet?: The
Long Road Toward Water Quality—Based Regulation under the CWA, 27 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,391 (1997) (analyzing the TMDL provision of the CWA).
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“A TMDL deﬁnes the speciﬁed maximum amount of a pollutant which can be
discharged or ‘loaded’ into the waters at issue from all combined sources.”52 The
CWA, however, never deﬁned the term “total maximum daily load.”53
Each state must submit its 303(d) list to EPA for approval.54 If EPA approves
the state’s list, the state then incorporates the list and any TMDLs done for these
waters into the state’s “continuing planning process” established pursuant to CWA
Section 303(e).55 A state’s continuing planning process is aimed at achieving
compliance with water quality standards if the point source efﬂuent limitations
are not sufﬁcient.56 The continuing planning process incorporates a variety of
water quality protection tools, such as individual point source permit efﬂuent
limitations, TMDLs, and area wide waste management plans for nonpoint
sources.57
The TMDL process includes identiﬁcation of existing sources of pollution
that have caused or contributed to the degraded water quality, then establishment
of “wasteload allocations” (for point sources of pollution) and “load allocations”
(for nonpoint sources of pollution) for those sources which have caused or
contributed to the degraded water.58 The ﬁnal TMDL represents a ratcheting
52

Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr. v. Clarke, 57 F.3d 1517, 1520 (9th Cir. 1995); Pronsolino,
291 F.3d at 1127–28.
53

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. E.P.A., 446 F.3d 140, 144–48 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that, in developing TMDLs, EPA and the
states must set daily limits on pollutant levels—rejecting EPA’s argument that the agencies could
base TMDLs on monthly or seasonal levels. Id. at 140. For an analysis of this issue, see Matthew
Chalker, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency: The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit Holds That ‘Daily’ Within the Context of the Clean Water Act, Unambiguously
Requires Daily Loads, 14 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 201 (2007) (discussing daily limits on pollutant
levels).
54

33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2).

55

33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2), (e).

56

33 U.S.C. § 1313(e).

57

33.U.S.C. § 1313(e)(3). In 2000, EPA issued regulations to require “implementation
plans” as part of TMDLs. Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation
and Revisions to the NPDES Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,586 (July 13, 2000). However, Congress
refused to fund the proposed regulations, keeping them ineffective until October 1, 2001. Military
Construction Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-246, § 8, 114 Stat. 511, 567 (2000).
Before the October 1, 2001 date could be reached, EPA suspended the regulations. Delay of Effective
Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and Revisions to the NPDES
Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 41,817 (Aug. 9, 2001). On March 19, 2003, EPA formally withdrew the
rule. Withdrawal of Revision to Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 68 Fed. Reg.
13,607 (Mar. 19, 2003). For a detailed discussion of the TMDL regulations, see Linda Malone,
Myths and Truths That Ended the 2000 TMDL Program, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 63 (2002); see also
Sarah Klahn, TMDLs: Another New Regulation, 34 A.B.A. SEC. OF ENV’T, ENERGY, & RES. TRENDS,
Dec. 2003, 12 (discussing TMDL regulations).
58
40 C.F.R. § 130.2(g), (h). See also Pronsolino, 291 F.3d at 1128 (discussing the structure of
TMDLs).
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down of the pollution sources via their respective pollutant loading allocations. If
TMDLs are properly adhered to, then the result would be restoration of the stream
to water quality standards. The TMDL reﬂects an impaired waterbody’s capacity
to tolerate point source, nonpoint source, and natural background pollution, with
a margin of error, while still meeting state water quality standards.59
Thus, the load and wasteload allocations and loading reductions detailed
in a TMDL serve a purpose—getting the impaired waterbody back to health.
The basic purpose for which TMDLs are established is the eventual attainment
of water quality standards.60 The TMDL speciﬁes the maximum amount of a
particular pollutant that can pass through a waterbody each day without water
quality standards being violated.61 Two of the leading TMDL decisions have
been issued by the United States Courts of Appeal for the Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits: Pronsolino v. Nastri, and Sierra Club v. Meiburg.62 These cases discussed
how TMDLs are established, with the goal of reducing both point and non-point
source loadings to the level at which stream standards can be achieved.63
Regarding individual discharges into an impaired water body, the Meiburg
court explained the following CWA requirements:
that individual-discharge permits will be adjusted and other
measures taken [such as reducing non-point source loadings] so
that the sum of that pollutant in the waterbody is reduced to the
level speciﬁed by the TMDL. As should be apparent, TMDLs are
central to the Clean Water Act’s water-quality scheme because . . .
“they tie together point-source and nonpoint-source pollution
issues in a manner that addresses the whole health of the water.”
....
. . . Point-source discharges are regulated through the federal
permit regime, with TMDLs incorporated into the efﬂuent and
technological-based limitations.64
In addition to the federal appellate court opinions in Pronsolino and Meiburg,
federal district courts have also recognized the connection between the loading
59

Pronsolino, 291 F.3d at 1128.

60

Id. at 1137.

61

Sierra Club v. Meiburg, 296 F.3d 1021, 1025 (11th Cir. 2002).

62

Pronsolino, 291 F.3d at 1127–29 (holding that TMDLs apply to nonpoint sources);
Meiburg, 296 F.3d at 1025–26 (holding that TMDLs are to be established even on streams that
have only nonpoint source loadings).
63

Pronsolino, 291 F.3d at 1127–29; Meiburg, 296 F.3d at 1025–26.

64

Meiburg, 296 F.3d at 1025 (citations omitted).
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restrictions established in the TMDL and restrictions on new or renewed NPDES
permits. In Friends of the Wild Swan, Inc. v. United States E.P.A., the court
prohibited EPA and the State of Montana from issuing any new NPDES permits
“until all necessary TMDLs are established for a particular WQLS [water quality
limited stream].”65 In Sierra Club v. Hankinson, the court ordered that:
To ensure that the TMDLs are used to improve water quality,
EPA shall implement . . . TMDLs through the NPDES
permitting program. This includes the following:
(a) Once the TMDL is established, EPA shall . . . cause the
modiﬁcation, revocation and reissuance, or termination of
permits where appropriate as necessary to implement the
TMDLs . . . ;
(b) EPA shall . . . comply with 40 CFR § 122.4(i) regarding
the prohibition on new sources or new dischargers that will
cause or contribute to a violation of water quality standards,
requiring new permitees or new dischargers to demonstrate
that there are sufﬁcient load allocations to allow for the
discharge and requiring that the existing dischargers into
that segment are subject to compliance schedules designed
to bring the WQLS into compliance with applicable water
quality standards.66
Although these decisions focused on TMDLs, the primary means of protecting
water quality and achieving water quality standards is through the establishment
of efﬂuent limitations for point sources, implemented through NPDES permits.67
In the 1980s and 1990s, there was a ﬂurry of litigation aimed at requiring
EPA and the states to promulgate TMDLs for water quality limited (impaired)
waters.68 Conservation groups were largely successful in getting the federal courts
to force EPA and the states to act.69 According to the EPA’s latest analysis, there
65
Friends of the Wild Swan, Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1203 (D. Mont.
1999), aff ’d in relevant part, 74 Fed. Appx. 718, 2003 WL 21751849 (9th Cir. 2003).
66

Sierra Club v. Hankinson, 939 F. Supp. 872, 873–74 (N.D. Ga. 1996).

67

See supra notes 22–32 and accompanying text.

68

For a detailed discussion of the TMDL litigation up to 1997, see Diane K. Conway, TMDL
Litigation: So Now What?, 17 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 83, 93–103 (1997). For a more recent analysis, see
Kelly Seaburg, Murky Waters: Courts Should Hold That the ‘Any-Progress-Is Sufﬁcient Progress’ Approach
to TMDL Development Under Section 303(d) of the Clean Water Act Is Arbitrary and Capricious, 82
WASH. L. REV. 767 (2007).
69

See, e.g., Scott v. City of Hammond, 741 F.2d 992 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 979 (1985); Friends of the Wild Swan, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1199; Kingman Park Civic Ass’n v.
U.S. E.P.A., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999); American Canoe Ass’n v. U.S. E.P.A., 54 F. Supp. 2d
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are 40,275 TMDLs that have been prepared on water bodies across the country.70
However, the conservationists’ subsequent attempts to use Section 303 and the
promulgation of TMDLs to actually force reductions in pollutant discharges into
impaired waters were not successful.71
This was because it was held that the promulgation of a TMDL does not,
by itself, require EPA or the states to reduce pollutant loadings into an impaired
water.72 In other words, neither EPA nor the states are independently required to
implement the loading restrictions contained in the TMDL.73 Rather, TMDLs
are to be used as part of a state’s continuing planning process to control nonpoint
source pollution, and as part of individual NPDES permits, to bring impaired
waters back to the point where they are no longer impaired—i.e., until the waters
meet water quality standards.74 However, according to one commentator, there
has been an “abject failure of the CPP [continuing planning process established
in CWA Section 303(e)] to lead to the clean up of non-point source impaired
waters.”75
This failure of the Section 303(e) continuing planning process to restore
impaired waters, coupled with the lack of any mechanism to enforce or implement
the loading restrictions of the TMDL, implies that TMDLs are the proverbial
toothless tigers when it comes to actually “restoring” impaired waters.76 When
viewed in isolation, that may be the case, as TMDLs are not self-implementing.
However, when viewed in conjunction with the NPDES permitting program and
its implementing regulations—particularly the requirement that all new permits
ensure that discharges do not “cause or contribute” to a violation of water quality
standards in the receiving waters—the load reductions contained in the TMDL
can become the driving force in restricting or preventing new discharges into
impaired waters.77 It is to this issue we now turn.
621 (E.D. Va. 1999); American Canoe Ass’n v. U.S. E.P.A., 30 F. Supp. 2d 908 (E.D. Va. 1998);
Hankinson, 939 F. Supp. 872; Idaho Sportsmen’s Coal. v. Browner, 951 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Wash.
1996); Sierra Club v. Browner, 843 F. Supp. 1304 (D. Minn. 1993); Alaska Ctr. for the Env’t v.
Reilly, 796 F. Supp. 1374 (W.D. Wash. 1992) aff ’d, Alaska Ctr. for the Env’t v. Browner, 20 F.3d
981 (9th Cir. 1994); Alaska Ctr. for the Env’t v. Reilly, 762 F. Supp. 1422 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
70
U.S. E.P.A., NATIONAL SUMMARY OF IMPAIRED WATERS AND TMDL INFORMATION, http://
iaspub.epa.gov/waters10/attains_nation_cy.control?p_report_type=T#APRTMDLS (last visited
Nov. 5, 2009).
71

See supra note 68 and accompanying text.

72

Meiburg, 296 F.3d at 1034.

73

Id.

74

Id. (discussing CWA Section 303(e) codiﬁed at 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e)).

75

Eric Huber, TMDLs: White Knight or Bureaucratic Nightmare, 4 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 14

(2003).
76

For a further discussion of the problems with the lack of “self-implementation” of TMDLs,

see id.
77

40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i) (2008).
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C. The EPA NPDES Permitting Regime for New Sources in Impaired
Waters
When EPA (or a state that has been delegated the Section 402 permitting
program) issues an NPDES permit, the agency must comply “with the applicable
water quality requirements of all affected states.”78 Moreover, the EPA or state
permitting agency is prohibited from issuing an NPDES permit “when the
conditions of the permit do not provide for compliance with the applicable
requirements of CWA, or regulations promulgated under CWA,” or “when the
imposition of conditions cannot ensure compliance with the applicable water
quality requirements of all affected states.”79
EPA’s long-standing regulations prohibit the issuance of an NPDES permit
for a new discharge where the discharge may “cause or contribute to the violation
of water quality standards”:
§ 122.4 Prohibitions. No permit may be issued:
(i) To a new source or a new discharger, if the discharge from
its construction or operation will cause or contribute to the
violation of water quality standards.80
This is a ﬂat-out prohibition against any new discharge that would cause or
contribute to a violation of a water quality standard.
This EPA regulation allows for one limited exception—contained in 40
C.F.R. § 122.4(i)(1) and (2)—to this prohibition of discharges into impaired
waters that already are violating the standard. In order for a discharge of the
pollutant in question to be allowed, the EPA regulations require strict assurances
that (1) the stream can handle the new discharge and still meet the standard and
(2) that speciﬁc plans are in place to ensure that the stream will be brought back
to health—i.e., achieve the applicable water quality standard for that waterbody.81
Speciﬁcally, the EPA regulations require that:
The owner or operator of a new source or new discharger
proposing to discharge into a water segment which does not
meet applicable water quality standards or is not expected to
meet those standards even after the application of the efﬂuent
limitations required by sections 301(b)(1)(A) and 301(b)(1)(B)

78

40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d).

79

40 C.F.R. § 122.4(a), (d).

80

40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i).

81

Id.
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of CWA and for which the State or interstate agency has
performed a pollutants load allocation for the pollutant to be
discharged, must demonstrate, before the close of the [NPDES
permit] public comment period, that:
(1) There are sufﬁcient remaining pollutant load allocations to
allow for the discharge; and
(2) The existing dischargers into that segment are subject to
compliance schedules designed to bring the segment into
compliance with applicable water quality standards.82
Thus, the permit applicant has the dual burden of demonstrating that “there are
sufﬁcient pollutant load allocations to allow for the discharge” and that “existing
dischargers into that segment are subject to compliance schedules designed to
bring the segment into compliance with applicable water quality standards.”83
Prior to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Pinto Creek, very few courts dealt
with 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i). In Friends of the Wild Swan, the Ninth Circuit upheld
a Montana federal district court’s stay of the issuance of NPDES permits for new
sources or discharges to impaired waters pending completion of TMDLs.84 The
district court’s action was taken pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i) and was set forth
as a remedy to compel the state of Montana to complete TMDLs for a number of
impaired waters.85
In Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition v. Horinko, San Francisco Baykeeper v.
Browner, and Sierra Club v. Hankinson, the regulation was raised, but was not the
primary issue in the litigation.86 In these cases, each court noted the language of
40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i) and appeared to read it similar to the interpretation argued
by the conservation groups in Pinto Creek, but did not address the language in
detail.87 In Horinko, the court noted that EPA agreed with the plaintiff ’s statement
that 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i) prohibited further discharges into an impaired water,

82

Id.

83

Id.

84

Friends of Wild Swan v. U.S. E.P.A., 74 Fed. App’x 718, 723–24, 2003 WL 21751849, at
*3–5 (9th Cir. 2003).
85

Id.; see also Friends of the Wild Swan, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 1203, 1207.

86

Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Horinko, 279 F. Supp. 2d 732, 774–75 (S.D. W. Va. 2003);
San Francisco Baykeeper v. Browner, 147 F. Supp. 2d 991, 995 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Hankinson, 939
F. Supp. at 874.
87
Horinko, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 774–75; San Francisco Baykeeper, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 995;
Hankinson, 939 F. Supp. at 874.
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unless strict controls under 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i) were in place.88 In San Francisco
Baykeeper, the court cited 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i) and held that “there cannot be a
new source or a new discharger if the waterbody is a WQLS [water quality limited
segment] impaired waterway unless the state completes a TMDL for that WQLS
beforehand.”89 Finally, in Hankinson, the court required TMDL development and
ordered:
EPA shall (or ensure that the State shall) comply with 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.4(i) regarding the prohibition on new sources or new
dischargers that will cause or contribute to a violation of water
quality standards, requiring new permittees or new dischargers
to demonstrate that there are sufﬁcient load allocations to allow
for the discharge and requiring that the existing dischargers into
that segment are subject to compliance schedules . . . .90
In one state case, Crutchﬁeld v. State Water Control Board, the Virginia
Court of Appeals interpreted a state regulation essentially identical to 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.4(i) and approved the state’s issuance of an NPDES permit into an
impaired water.91 Crutchﬁeld held that since the level of pollutant of concern in
the discharge, dissolved oxygen, would be less than the level of that pollutant in
the receiving water, the new discharge would not cause or contribute to a violation
of the dissolved oxygen standard.92 Notably, however, Crutchﬁeld addressed only
the ﬁrst sentence of 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i), holding that the second sentence of the
regulation was inapplicable to the facts, because there was no TMDL at issue—
unlike the situation in Pinto Creek.93
Thus, faced with little consistent guidance or precedent regarding the
application of 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i) and the protection of impaired waters, the
court in Pinto Creek was faced with the task of deciding these issues on essentially
ﬁrst impression.94

88

Horinko, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 774–75.

89

San Francisco Baykeeper, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 995.

90

Hankinson, 939 F. Supp. at 874.

91

Crutchﬁeld v. State Water Control Bd., 612 S.E.2d 249, 251 (Va. Ct. App. 2005). The
Virginia regulation, 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 25-31-50(C)(9) (2009), contains identical language to
that found in the EPA regulation, 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i); see also Crutchﬁeld, 612 S.E.2d at 255.
92

Crutchﬁeld, 612 S.E.2d at 255.

93

Id. at 258.

See Jeffrey M. Gaba, New Sources, New Growth and the Clean Water Act, 55 ALA. L. REV.
651, 664–71 (2004) (discussing the confusion surrounding TMDLs and § 122.4(i) prior to Pinto
Creek).
94
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II. PINTO CREEK AND THE DUTY TO PROTECT IMPAIRED WATERS
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision
in Pinto Creek was the ﬁrst federal court decision that squarely addressed the
interconnection between CWA Section 303(d), TMDLs, the NPDES permitting
program, and EPA’s 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i) impaired waters regulation. The decision
was the result of over ten years of agency review, administrative appeals, and federal
court litigation—all triggered by the NPDES permit application submitted by
the Carlota Copper Company to EPA.95

A. The Road to Pinto Creek
Pinto Creek involved EPA’s issuance of an NPDES permit which authorized
discharges from the Carlota Copper Mine. The Mine would cover an area of
over 3,000 acres and mine an estimated 100 million tons of ore from four open
pits.96 The Mine would be located on a mixture of public and private lands near
the small town of Miami, Arizona, situated in the mountains approximately 100
miles east of Phoenix.97 The challenged permit authorized Carlota to discharge a
number of pollutants, including dissolved copper, into Pinto Creek from its mine
facilities. As described by the EPA’s Environmental Appeals Board (EAB) in its
decision rejecting the conservation groups’ administrative appeal of the NPDES
permit:
Carlota plans to use ﬁve separate areas for waste rock disposal. . . .
Carlota will build seven storm water and sediment retention
basins, or retention ponds, to capture storm water runoff and
sediment from the slopes of the waste rock dumps. The basins
will contain outlet structures to release storm water if a storm
event exceeds the design criteria. These outlets, where discharges
could occur during large precipitation events, are outfalls that
require an NPDES permit.98

95
Carlota Copper Company submitted its NPDES permit application to EPA, as the
permitting agency for NPDES permits in Arizona at the time (1998). Since that time, EPA has
approved the delegation of the NPDES permitting program to the State of Arizona. This delegation
was approved by the United States Supreme Court, which rejected a challenge to the delegation
by conservation groups. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644
(2007). The delegation of permitting authority to Arizona during the pendency of Pinto Creek did
not alter the Ninth Circuit’s decision, since the NPDES permit had been issued by EPA.
96
Friends of Pinto Creek v. U.S. E.P.A. (Pinto Creek), 504 F.3d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 2007),
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 896 (2009).
97
In re Carlota Copper Co., 11 E.A.D. 692, 702 (Sept. 30, 2004), available at http://www.
epa.gov/eab/disk11/carlota.pdf (citations omitted).
98

Id. at 703–04.
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Carlota also would divert approximately 5,300 feet (over one mile) of Pinto
Creek around the largest of the open pits, redirecting the stream into a concrete
channel.99 The mine’s operation would also require a sulfuric acid leach pad,
with a capacity of 100 million tons, to be located directly in what is now Powers
Gulch.100 Approximately 7,300 feet of Powers Gulch would also be diverted
around the leach pad and redirected through a concrete channel.101 The operation
plan also includes buried cut-off walls to direct groundwater into the surface
diversion channels and away from the mine.102 These diversion channels would
also discharge copper and other pollutants into Pinto Creek.103
The State of Arizona had classiﬁed both Pinto Creek and Powers Gulch for
the designated uses of a warm water ﬁshery, recreation, and ﬁsh consumption
and agricultural uses.104 The Pinto Creek watershed contains a number of active,
inactive, and abandoned copper mines that release copper into the stream.105 As a
result of this copper contamination, Pinto Creek is included on Arizona’s Section
303(d) list of impaired waters due to non-attainment of water quality standards
for dissolved copper.”106
EPA originally issued a Draft NPDES Permit for the Carlota Copper Mine
in 1998.107 After receiving public comment on the draft permit, on July 24, 2000,
EPA issued a Final Permit (Permit) for the discharges from the Carlota Mine.108
On August 24, 2000, a coalition of conservation groups appealed that Permit
with the EAB, the EPA’s internal administrative review body.109 In that appeal,

99

Id. at 703.

100

Id.

101

Id.

102

Pinto Creek, 504 F.3d at 1009.

103

Id. at 1015–16.

U.S. E.P.A., 2004 WATERBODY REPORT FOR PINTO CREEK, http://iaspub.epa.gov/
tmdl_waters10/attains_waterbody.control?p_list_id=&p_au_id=AZ15060103-018B_00&p_
cycle=2004&p_state=AZ (last visited Oct. 29, 2009). Arizona water quality standards are established
pursuant to ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R18-11-101 to -205 (2009).
104

Pinto Creek, 504 F.3d at 1009; see also Carlota, 11 E.A.D. at 702; U.S. E.P.A., ARIZONA
WATER QUALITY ASSESSMENT TRACKING REPORT, UPPER SALT WATERSHED (2004), http://iaspub.epa.
gov/waters10/attains_watershed.control?p_state=AZ&p_huc=15060103.
105

106

Pinto Creek, 504 F.3d at 1009.

107

Id. at 1010.

108

Id.

109

EPA’s decisionmaking procedures are governed by its regulations at 40 C.F.R. Part 124
(2008). Appeals of EPA-issued NPDES permits are ﬁled pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 124.19 (2008).
Upon the ﬁling of an appeal, the permit is stayed until the EAB’s resolution of the appeal. See 40
C.F.R. § 124.16 (2008).
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Petitioners argued that EPA had violated the substantive provisions of the Clean
Water Act and failed to adequately provide for public notice and comment on the
Permit.110
Instead of responding to that original appeal, EPA withdrew the challenged
NPDES permit.111 In April of 2001, in response to the appeal, EPA issued its
TMDL for Pinto Creek, entitled “Total Maximum Daily Load for Copper in
Pinto Creek, Arizona” which established allowable pollutant loadings for Pinto
Creek designed to restore Pinto Creek to a condition in which it would comply
with designated water quality standards (2001 TMDL).112 In May of 2001, EPA
issued its Supplemental Environmental Assessment, prepared pursuant to the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) for the NPDES permit.113
On February 27, 2002, EPA reissued the Final NPDES permit, along with
the Amended Record of Decision and Finding of No Signiﬁcant Impact.114 The
conservation groups again ﬁled an appeal of the new Final Permit with the EAB
on March 29, 2002.115 After brieﬁng and argument, the EAB issued its Order
Denying Review on September 30, 2004.116 The conservation groups then
appealed the EAB’s decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in San Francisco in February 2005.
The EPA’s position at the center of the dispute in Pinto Creek—involving the
interpretation of 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i)—was summarized by the EAB’s decision:

110

See generally Pinto Creek, 504 F.3d 1007. The conservation group petitioners before the EAB
were: Friends of Pinto Creek, the National Wildlife Federation, the Arizona Wildlife Federation,
Grand Canyon Chapter of the Sierra Club, Mineral Policy Center, Maricopa Audubon Society, and
Citizens for the Preservation of Powers Gulch and Pinto Creek.
111
See In re Carlota, 11 E.A.D. at 702 (discussing the procedural aspects of the case before the
EAB); see also Pinto Creek, 504 F.3d at 1010.
112
U.S. E.P.A., TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD FOR COPPER IN PINTO CREEK, ARIZONA (2001),
available at http://www.epa.gov/waters/tmdldocs/11700_11700.pdf .
113
“NEPA [42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq.,] requires [federal] agencies to examine potential
environmental effects of any proposed action, and to inform the public of its studies and resulting
concerns.” Pinto Creek, 504 F.3d at 1016–17. In Pinto Creek, the conservation groups argued that
EPA failed to conduct the proper NEPA review in its issuance of the NPDES permit, particularly
EPA’s failure to consider the environmental impacts from the pollutants, including copper,
discharged into Pinto Creek from the diversion channels. Id. at 1017. The Ninth Circuit held that
the EAB decision had improperly ruled that the groups had not sufﬁciently raised their NEPA
concerns during the administrative process. Id. Regarding other NEPA issues raised by the groups,
the Ninth Circuit declined to rule on these because of its ﬁnding that the permit violated the CWA.
Id. This article does not discuss these NEPA issues.
114

Pinto Creek, 504 F.3d at 1010.

115

Id.

116

In re Carlota, 11 E.A.D. at 692.
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Petitioners further contend that the Region cannot allow new
copper discharges into any segment of Pinto Creek prior to
the implementation of the Pinto Creek TMDL and restoration
of the water body. There is nothing in the statute, the cases
Petitioners cite, or 40 C.F.R. section 122.4(i) providing that an
impaired water segment needs to be restored prior to allowing
new source discharges into the water body. The Board declines
to endorse Petitioners’ interpretation because to do so would
perpetrate the very outcome the Supreme Court in Arkansas v.
Oklahoma sought to avoid (adoption of a rigid approach that
might frustrate the construction of new facilities that would
improve existing conditions). The Board ﬁnds no clear error
in the Region’s determination that Carlota’s discharges will not
“cause or contribute” to a violation of water quality standards,
but rather, Carlota will improve existing conditions because the
reductions that will result from its activities are greater than the
projected discharges. In addition, the Region did not clearly err
in determining that “there are sufﬁcient remaining pollutant
load allocations to allow for Carlota’s discharges.” The Pinto
Creek TMDL speciﬁcally provides pollutant load allocations for
Carlota, and the Board has no reason to disregard the TMDL
ﬁndings, especially because the TMDL has not been challenged
in the proper forum. Moreover, contrary to Petitioners’
assertions, the requirements in section 122.4(i)(2) can only
apply to point sources. Under the CWA the Agency only has
authority to promulgate regulations for point sources, and by
section 122.4(i)(2)’s use of the term “compliance schedules,”
the Agency has signaled its intention that the requirements
apply to existing “permit holders,” as opposed to all dischargers
(permitted and unpermitted) as Petitioners propose.117
According to the EAB, the fact that EPA required Carlota to “offset” its proposed
new copper discharges by “improv[ing] existing conditions because the reductions
that will result from its activities are greater than the projected discharges” was the
critical factor in the EAB’s decision—and set the stage for the Ninth Circuit’s
ruling in Pinto Creek.

B. The Heart of the Dispute: EPA’s “Offset” Theory
As a result of the ﬁrst appeal of the 2000 Permit to the EAB, EPA completed
its TMDL for Pinto Creek.118 In that TMDL, EPA established reduced allowable
pollutant loadings for all of the copper discharges into Pinto Creek designed
117

Id. at 695 (citations omitted).

118

See Pinto Creek, 504 F.3d at 1010 (describing the permitting and appeal process).
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to bring Pinto Creek back to a condition in which it would meet the copper
standard.119 The sources of copper loading to be reduced included an active
copper mine and numerous inactive mines.120
The challenged NPDES permit authorized Carlota to discharge additional
copper into the stretch of Pinto Creek that was listed on Arizona’s 303(d) list
as impaired for copper.121 EPA’s proposed solution to the copper loading at the
Carlota Mine site was to “offset” this new copper loading by requiring Carlota
to reduce copper loadings in upper Pinto Creek by partially cleaning up a small
inactive copper mine over ﬁve miles upstream—the Gibson Mine.122 The Gibson
Mine is just one of the numerous sources of copper loading covered by the
TMDL.123
Although the reduction of copper loadings from the Gibson Mine partial
cleanup would reduce overall copper loadings to Pinto Creek, without additional
reductions Pinto Creek would still not achieve the required copper standard.124
Thus, once the Carlota Mine commenced its discharge of additional copper
into Pinto Creek, the stream would still exceed the copper standard and still be
classiﬁed as an impaired water.125
EPA and Carlota argued that under this “offset,” the total amount of copper
in the entire reach of Pinto Creek would be reduced, even with the additional
copper discharges from the new mine.126 Thus, according to EPA and Carlota,
due to this “offset,” the new copper discharges from the Mine would not “cause
or contribute” to a violation of the copper standard. The conservation groups
argued, in contrast, that the upstream “offset” was but one part of the larger
need to reduce all of the copper loadings into Pinto Creek so that Carlota’s new
discharge would not “cause or contribute” to the violation of the copper standard
at the point of discharge.127

119
U.S. E.P.A., TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD FOR COPPER
http://www.epa.gov/waters/tmdldocs/11700_11700.pdf .
120

Id.

121

Pinto Creek, 504 F.3d at 1009.

122

Id. at 1012.

U.S. E.P.A., TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD FOR COPPER
http://www.epa.gov/waters/tmdldocs/11700_11700.pdf.
123

124

Id. at 16.

125

Id.

126

Pinto Creek, 504 F.3d at 1012.

127

Id. at 1011–12.
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The Pinto Creek case was the ﬁrst federal court decision to review the legality
of EPA’s “offset” policy, which EPA had been developing for a number of years.128
In 1999, as part of a rulemaking which dealt with TMDLs, EPA proposed the
use of offsets as a means to meet overall water quality standards in a watershed.129
After four years of congressional and administrative disputes over the rules, EPA
formally revoked the proposal.130 However, also, in 2003, EPA published its
Water Quality Trading Policy, which approved the use of “offsets” for discharges
into impaired waters.131 As EPA stated in the promulgation of its Trading Policy:
Water quality trading is a voluntary, incentive-based approach
that can offer greater efﬁciency in restoring or protecting water
bodies. Trading allows a source to meet its regulatory obligations
by using pollutant reductions created by another party with
lower pollution control costs. EPA’s ﬁnal Water Quality Trading
Policy offers guidance to states and tribes on developing and
implementing water quality trading programs.132
According to EPA’s Trading Policy, new dischargers could “[o]ffset[] new or
increased discharges resulting from growth in order to maintain levels of water

128
For an analysis in favor of trading and offsets under the CWA, see Kurt Stephenson et
al., Toward an Effective Watershed-based Efﬂuent Allowance Trading System: Identifying the Statutory
and Regulatory Barriers to Implementation, 5 ENVTL. L. 775 (1999). See also Esther Bartﬁeld, PointNonpoint Source Trading: Looking Beyond Potential Cost Savings, 23 ENVTL. L. 43, 51–52, 58, 72–74,
105 (1993); Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Thinking About Environmentally Sustainable Development in
the American West, 18 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 123, 133–34 (1998) (suggesting that TMDLs
can create opportunities for pollutant trading among point and nonpoint sources); William Taylor
& Mark Gerath, The Watershed Protection Approach: Is The Promise About to Be Realized?, 11 NAT.
RES. & ENV’T 16, 20 (1996) (discussing pollutant trading using TMDLs).
129
Revisions to the NPDES Program and Federal Antidegradation Policy in Support of
Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 64 Fed. Reg. 46,058
(proposed Aug. 23, 1999). In 2000, EPA issued the ﬁnal regulations. Revisions to the Water
Quality Planning and Management Regulation and Revisions to the NPDES Program, 65 Fed.
Reg. 43,586 (July 13, 2000). However, Congress refused to fund the proposed regulations, keeping
them ineffective until October 1, 2001. Military Construction Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 106-246, 114 Stat. 511, 567, Title II, § 8 (2000). Before the October 1, 2001 date could be
reached, EPA suspended the regulations. Delay of Effective Date of Revisions to the Water Quality
Planning and Management Regulation and Revisions to the NPDES Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 41,817
(Aug. 9, 2001).
130

On March 19, 2003, EPA issued a rule formally withdrawing the proposed TMDL
regulations. Withdrawal of Revision to Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 68
Fed. Reg. 13,607 (Mar. 19, 2003). For a detailed discussion of the TMDL regulations, see Linda
Malone, Myths and Truths That Ended the 2000 TMDL Program, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 63 (2002).
131
68 Fed. Reg. 1608 (Jan. 13, 2003). For an argument in favor of water pollution trading,
see James S. Shortle & Richard D. Horan, Water Quality Trading, 14 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 231
(2006).
132

Water Quality Trading Policy, 68 Fed. Reg. at 1608.
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quality that support all designated uses.”133 Under the Trading Policy, “EPA
interprets 40 CFR [§] 122.4(i) to allow for a new source or a new discharger to
compensate for its entire increased load through trading.”134
In its brieﬁng to the Ninth Circuit in Pinto Creek, EPA argued that its offset
and trading policy, as implemented in Carlota’s NPDES permit, satisﬁed the
CWA and, more speciﬁcally, the requirement in 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i) that a new
discharge not “cause or contribute” to a violation of any water quality standard:
As the EAB held, the record establishes that “the copper loadings
into Pinto Creek attributable to the Gibson Mine exceed
Carlota’s projected loadings and that the . . . Gibson Mine
[remediation] will offset any discharges [by] Carlota[]. . . .”
Thus, “rather than ‘causing or contributing’ a degradation,
Carlota will be improving Pinto Creek’s water quality, or at the
very least maintaining water quality.”135
The conservation groups did not challenge the fact that, on paper, the
projected reductions in copper loading from the remediation of the upstream
Gibson Mine exceeded the amount of copper loading from the new permitted
outfalls at the downstream Carlota copper mine. Rather, the groups argued that,
at the point of discharge at the new mine site, the copper standard would still be
exceeded by the new discharges, regardless of the upstream copper reductions.
According to the conservation groups, the Gibson “offset” was just one of the
many pollutant load reductions described in EPA’s TMDL and without a plan
to implement all of the watershed-wide reductions detailed in the TMDL, the
copper standard would never be achieved. The conservation groups summarized
this argument in the following passage from their brief to the Ninth Circuit:
EPA and Carlota defend the EPA’s permitting decisions based
on an “offset” theory and ignore the fundamental requirement
of the Clean Water Act . . . —that new pollution discharges
cannot violate established water quality standards . . . . In EPA/
Carlota’s view, the company’s proposal to reduce some of the
copper loadings to Pinto Creek from another source (the Gibson
Mine) allows EPA to overlook the undisputed fact that Carlota’s
new discharges will exceed the allowable amount of copper in
the stream at the point of discharge.

133

Id. at 1610.

134

EPA Water Quality Trading Toolkit for Permit Writers, EPA 833-R-07-004, at 24 (June
2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/wqtradingtoolkit.pdf.
135

Brief for Respondents, Pinto Creek, 504 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-70785), 2005
WL 6269928, at *23 (citations omitted).
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Such a scheme violates the CWA and its implementing
regulations. In fact, the EPA’s TMDL, . . . completed for Pinto
Creek shows that even with the Gibson partial remediation, the
additional pollution from Carlota will cause the load allocations
and WQS [water quality standards] in Pinto Creek to be
exceeded.
Overall, the key focus is at the point of the new discharge—
will the discharge cause or contribute to a violation of WQS?
Here, the undisputed answer is Yes. The fact that upstream copper
levels may decrease somewhat—a very laudable goal—does not
mean that the new discharge complies with the CWA.136
Faced with these conﬂicting interpretations of the CWA, 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i),
and the ability to “offset” or “trade” pollutant loading within a watershed, the
stage was set for the Ninth Circuit to issue its ruling.137
Complicating this dispute were a pair of decisions by the Minnesota courts
that were issued during the Pinto Creek litigation. In the ﬁrst case, In re the
Cities of Annandale and Maple Lake NPDES/SDS Permit Issuance for Discharge of
Treated Wastewater, the Minnesota State Court of Appeals overturned the state
agency’s issuance of an NPDES permit based on a similar “offset” defense.138 In
Annandale, the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency issued an NPDES permit
for a proposed wastewater treatment plant that would discharge phosphorus into
a waterbody listed as impaired for phosphorus.139 The appeals court rejected the

136

Reply Brief for Petitioners, Pinto Creek, 504 F.3d 1007 (No. 05-70785), 2005 WL
4220331, at *1.
137
In previous analysis of this issue, some commentators had presented essentially the same
argument as that asserted by the conservation groups in Pinto Creek:

The regulations [§ 122.4(i)] prohibit the issuance of an NPDES permit to a new
source if the source’s pollution “will cause or contribute to the violation of water
quality standards.” A new pollutant source cannot help but “contribute” to a
violation of the applicable standards for that pollutant on a waterbody that was
listed because of violations of those same standards, even if pollutant loading from
the new source will be offset by an equivalent load reduction from an existing
source.
Michael M. Wenig, How ‘Total’ Are ‘Total Maximum Daily Loads’?—Legal Issues Regarding the Scope
of Watershed-Based Pollution Control Under the Clean Water Act, 12 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 87, 120–21
(1998) (citations omitted); see also Diane K. Conway, TMDL Litigation: So Now What?, 17 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 83, 118 (1997) (“While this regulation has been on the books for close to twenty years,
the EPA has never enforced it.”); Houck, TMDLs III, supra note 51, at 10,420.
138
In re Cities of Annandale and Maple Lake (In re Annandale I ), 702 N.W.2d 768, 774
(Minn. Ct. App. 2005).
139

Id. at 769–70.
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“offset” defense: “This reduced discharge from other sources, . . . does not rectify
the violation of water-quality standards.”140
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in a split decision, overturned the lower
court decision and reinstated the NPDES permit.141 The Minnesota Supreme
Court held that, due to the proposed “offset” from reduced pollutant loadings
from other sources, the pollutant loading from the new discharge would therefore
not “cause or contribute” to a violation of water quality standards.142
Notably, despite the seeming conﬂict between the Minnesota Supreme
Court’s decision in Annandale and the Ninth Circuit’s eventual decision in Pinto
Creek, the Ninth Circuit did not discuss Annandale. EPA had argued to the Ninth
Circuit that the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision supported EPA’s “offset”
theory and its issuance of the NPDES permit to Carlota.143
Annandale, however involved a different factual scenario and focused on a
different part of the applicable regulation. In Annandale, unlike the situation in
Pinto Creek, the water body did not have a TMDL—a critical distinction between
the cases.144 Thus, there was no need for the Annandale court to apply the second
sentence of 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i)—the sentence that was a key part of the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Pinto Creek.145 Instead, Annandale focused extensively on
interpretation of the phrase “cause or contribute to the violation of water
quality standards” in the ﬁrst sentence of the regulation, and never reached the
interpretation of the second sentence (due in large part to the lack of any TMDL
in that case).146

C. The Ninth Circuit Rejects the “Offset” Theory and Prohibits New
Discharges Until Compliance Plans Are in Place to Bring the Impaired
Water Back to Health
In Pinto Creek, the Ninth Circuit framed the fundamental issue in the case as:
“Whether the issuance of the permit to discharge a pollutant, dissolved copper,
into Pinto Creek, which already exceeded the amount of dissolved copper allowed
140

Id at 774.

141

In re Cities of Annandale and Maple Lake (In re Annandale II ), 731 N.W.2d 502, 525–26
(Minn. 2007).
142
Id. at 516–22. In re Annandale II is discussed in detail in Mehmet K. Konar-Steenberg, In
Re Annandale and the Disconnections Between Minnesota and Federal Agency Deference Doctrine, 34
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1375 (2008).
143
Letter from D. Judith Keith, Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, to Cathy
Catterson, Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (May 29, 2007) (on ﬁle with author).
144

See generally In re Annandale II, 731 N.W.2d at 502.

145

See infra notes 206–09 and accompanying text.

146

In re Annandale II, 731 N.W.2d at 517 n.11.
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under the Section 303(d) Water Quality Standard, is in violation of the Clean
Water Act and applicable regulations.”147 The Ninth Circuit’s decision squarely
rejected the “offset” defense raised by EPA and Carlota.148
The court started with its interpretation of the ﬁrst sentence of 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.4(i). That sentence reads: “Prohibitions. No permit may be issued: . . .
(i) To a new source or a new discharger, if the discharge from its construction or
operation will cause or contribute to the violation of water quality standards.”149
Relying on the stated objective of the CWA “to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the nation’s waters,” the court held that “[t]he
plain language of the ﬁrst sentence of the regulation is very clear that no permit
may be issued to a new discharger if the discharge will contribute to the violation
of water quality standards.”150
Regarding EPA and Carlota’s “offset” defense, the court held that: “[T]here
is nothing in the Clean Water Act or the regulation that provides an exception
for an offset when the waters remain impaired and the new source is discharging
pollution into that impaired water.”151 The court noted that 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i)
allows for an exception to this strict rule when a TMDL has been completed.152
However, this exception does not apply unless the new source can demonstrate
that, under the TMDL, a plan is designed to bring the water into compliance
with applicable water quality standards.153
The court noted that, in addition to the requirement that a TMDL be
performed, the discharger must demonstrate that two conditions are met. These
two conditions are contained in the two numbered clauses in 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i):
(1) There are sufﬁcient remaining pollutant load allocations
to allow for the discharge; and

147

Pinto Creek, 504 F.3d at 1009.

148

Id. at 1012.

149

40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i).

150

Pinto Creek, 504 F.3d at 1012.

151

Id. In contrast, the federal Clean Air Act speciﬁcally allows new air pollutant dischargers to
obtain a permit by offsetting their emissions. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(1)(A) (2006). That Act allows
the permitting of new air emission sources if “sufﬁcient offsetting emissions reductions have been
obtained, such that total allowable emissions from existing sources in the region, from new or
modiﬁed sources which are not major emitting facilities, and from the proposed source will be
sufﬁciently less than total emissions from existing sources.” Id.
152

Pinto Creek, 504 F.3d at 1012.

153

Id.
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(2) The existing dischargers into that segment are subject
to compliance schedules designed to bring the segment into
compliance with applicable water quality standards.154
In Pinto Creek, EPA had argued that the ﬁrst clause is satisﬁed because the
“TMDL provides a method by which the [pollutant load] allocations could be
established to allow for the discharge.”155 EPA relied upon its previous NPDES
and proposed TMDL regulations, which provided that the establishment of the
load reductions contained in the TMDL, by themselves, established the necessary
“remaining pollutant load allocations to allow for the discharge.”156
A new source or new discharger may, however, obtain a permit
for discharge into a water segment which does not meet
applicable water quality standards by submitting information
demonstrating that there is sufﬁcient loading capacity remaining
in waste load allocations (WLAs) for the stream segment to
accommodate the new discharge and that existing dischargers
to that segment are subject to compliance schedules designed
to bring the segment into compliance with the applicable water
quality standards.157
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, noting that the TMDL only set targets for the
eventual load reductions along Pinto Creek that would need to be met before the
stream met the copper standard. The court explained that the “TMDL merely
provides for the manner in which Pinto Creek could meet the water quality
standards if all of the load allocations in the TMDL were met, not that there are
sufﬁcient remaining pollutant load allocations under existing circumstances.”158
Of critical importance to the court’s decision in Pinto Creek was the fact
that the EPA’s TMDL found that a number of existing sources of copper loading
into Pinto Creek needed to reduce their copper discharges before the stream

154

40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i). The Ninth Circuit speciﬁcally held that, in order for the “exception”
to the prohibition of new discharges into impaired waters to apply, both clauses needed to met by
the permit applicant. Pinto Creek, 504 F.3d at 1013.
155

Pinto Creek, 504 F.3d at 1012.

156

Amendments to Streamline the NPDES Program Regulations: Round Two, 65 Fed. Reg.
30,886, 30,888 (May 15, 2000); see also Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management
Regulation and Revisions to the NPDES Program in Support of Revisions to the Water Quality
Planning and Management Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,586, 43,588 (July 13, 2000) (discussing
implementation of TMDL ﬁndings and load reductions). These regulations were never made
effective. See supra note 57.
157
Amendments to Streamline the NPDES Program Regulations: Round Two, 65 Fed. Reg.
at 30,888.
158

Pinto Creek, 504 F.3d at 1012 (emphasis in original).
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would achieve the copper standard.159 The upstream Gibson Mine that was to
be remediated was only one of these existing sources. These additional sources
include a mixture of point and nonpoint sources such as another active copper
mine, inactive mines, abandoned mines, as well as the Gibson Mine and the
proposed discharges from the new Carlota Mine.160 In other words, even with the
Gibson “cleanup”––due to the lack of any plan or schedule to deal with the other
sources––there still would not be enough assimilative capacity in Pinto Creek to
handle Carlota’s new copper discharges.
Before the Ninth Circuit in Pinto Creek, EPA took the position that as long
as the TMDL “pollutant load allocations” are produced on paper (i.e., in the
TMDL document), this document satisﬁes 40 C.F.R. §122.4(i)(1)’s requirement
that “there are sufﬁcient remaining pollutant load allocations to allow for the
discharge.”161 The critical issue in complying with 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i) is whether
there will be sufﬁcient capacity in the receiving stream to handle the new discharge
of the pollutant initially responsible for the stream being impaired. The key is
to reduce these loadings “so that the sum of that pollutant in the waterbody is
reduced to the level speciﬁed by the TMDL.”162
In other words, a critical focus of review is the stream reach receiving the new
discharge. Any “offset” occurring prior to the new discharge is relevant only if
the “offset” is of such magnitude that the stream will still achieve standards, even
after the new loadings.163 Even if the new permittee is allowed to discharge prior
to the achievement of the applicable standard, 40 C.F.R. §122.4(i) requires that
plans and schedules are in place so that the standard will be achieved according
to the TMDL stream restoration plan—even with the addition of the new copper
loadings from the new source.164
In Pinto Creek, the TMDL’s load allocation for the new Carlota copper
discharge was based on the assumption that all the other sources were also meeting
their allocations.165 The TMDL concluded that Pinto Creek could accommodate
Carlota’s new discharges only if all of the other sources were meeting their reduced
allocations, not just the Gibson Mine. Thus, only upon implementation of all of

159
Id.; see also U.S. E.P.A., TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD FOR COPPER IN PINTO CREEK, ARIZONA
(2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/waters/tmdldocs/11700_11700.pdf.
160
U.S. E.P.A., TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD FOR COPPER IN PINTO CREEK, ARIZONA (2001),
available at http://www.epa.gov/waters/tmdldocs/1170_11700.pdf.
161

Brief for Respondents, supra note 135, at *21–22.

162

Sierra Club v. Meiburg, 296 F.3d 1021, 1025 (11th Cir. 2002).

163

Pinto Creek, 504 F.3d at 1012.

164

Id. at 1013.

U.S. E.P.A., TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD FOR COPPER IN PINTO CREEK, ARIZONA, at 16
(2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/waters/tmdldocs/11700_11700.pdf.
165
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the wasteload and load allocations prescribed in the TMDL would Pinto Creek
meet water quality standards.166 There was, however, no plan in place for the
remediation of any sources other than the Gibson Mine. The Ninth Circuit
correctly noted that “[t]he only step the EPA or Carlota has taken to meet the
requirements of [40 C.F.R.] § 122.4(i) is the partial remediation of the Gibson
Mine discharge.”167 The lack of any plan to reduce the copper sources identiﬁed
in the TMDL was critical to the Ninth Circuit’s ﬁndings regarding 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.4(i)(2), which required that the NPDES permit applicant demonstrate that:
“the existing dischargers into that segment are subject to compliance schedules
designed to bring the segment into compliance with applicable water quality
standards.”168
The court required that these plans must not only show what pollutant load
reductions are needed to bring a water body back to health, but also actually how
these reductions will be achieved.
The error of both the EPA and Carlota is that the objective of
. . . [40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i)(2)] is not simply to show a lessening
of pollution, but to show how the water quality standards will
be met if Carlota is allowed to discharge pollutants into the
impaired waters.169
The Pinto Creek court further found that “compliance schedules” must be
established for all “existing dischargers” into Pinto Creek, so that the stream could
accommodate the new and increased copper discharges from the Carlota Mine.170
The court held that all point sources must be subject to these compliances
schedules (i.e., plans designed to reduce the pollutant loading from each source
so the stream segment would be brought into compliance with water quality
standards).171 The court speciﬁcally rejected EPA’s argument that only currently
permitted point source discharges were subject to the “compliance schedule”
requirement.172 The Pinto Creek court established the basic procedure that must
be followed before a new NPDES permit is issued for a discharge into an impaired
water:
If point sources, other than the permitted point source, are
necessary to be scheduled in order to achieve the water quality
standard, then EPA must locate any such point sources and
166

Id.

167

Pinto Creek, 504 F.3d at 1014 n.2.

168

40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i).

169

Pinto Creek, 504 F.3d at 1014.

170

Id. at 1012–13.

171

Id.

172

Id. at 1013.
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establish compliance schedules to meet the water quality
standard before issuing a permit. If there are not adequate point
sources to do so, then a permit cannot be issued unless the state
or [the discharge permit applicant] agrees to establish a schedule
to limit pollution from a nonpoint source or sources sufﬁcient to
achieve water quality standards.173
On this point, EPA had correctly argued that nothing in the CWA compelled
it to act against other dischargers. However, the Pinto Creek court noted that its
ruling did not force EPA to take any action requiring existing discharges to reduce
their pollutant loadings. Rather, “[t]he EPA remains free to establish its priorities;
it just cannot issue a permit to a new discharger until it has complied with [40
C.F.R.] § 122.4(i).”174
Lastly, the Pinto Creek court noted that its ruling does not require that the
remediation of all the existing discharges into the impaired stream segment (in
order to achieve the water quality standards) be actually completed prior to the
issuance of a new NPDES permit pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i).175 Rather,
Pinto Creek required that the compliance schedules mandated by 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.4(i)(2) and the court’s own ruling be established for all the discharges
prior to issuance of the new permit.176 The problem with the NPDES permit
in Pinto Creek was that––except for the partial remediation of the old Gibson
mine––none of the other copper sources discharging into Pinto Creek had any
schedules established to reduce the overall copper loadings into the stream to the
point where the stream would achieve the copper standard.177
Therefore, although EPA and the states are not required to “implement”
the TMDL and its loading reductions for a particular pollutant, neither EPA
nor a state permitting agency can issue a new NPDES permit for discharges
into that impaired waterbody without the necessary compliance plans in place.
Pinto Creek thus closes the loophole that had developed in the CWA § 303 and
TMDL program, as a result of the cases that held that TMDLs were not “selfimplementing.”178 While TMDLs may continue to be “paper tigers” standing
alone, after Pinto Creek the loading reductions contained in the TMDL are now
the critical factors in restoring the health of impaired waters. In other words,
the loading reductions in the TMDL are now essentially implemented via Pinto

173

Id. at 1014.

174

Id. at 1015.

175

Id. at 1013.

176

Id.

177

Id.

178

See supra notes 68–77 and accompanying text.
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Creek’s prohibition against new discharges that fail to contain compliance plans
and loading reductions found in the TMDL.

D. The Lack of a Conﬂict Between Pinto Creek and the Supreme Court’s
Decision in Arkansas v. Oklahoma
EPA and Carlota argued that the conservation groups’ interpretation of the
CWA and 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i) in Pinto Creek conﬂicted with the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Arkansas v. Oklahoma.179 In Arkansas, the state of
Oklahoma challenged EPA’s issuance of an NPDES permit to a sewage treatment
plant in Arkansas which discharged into a river ﬂowing into Oklahoma.180
Oklahoma argued that EPA could not issue such a permit because the discharge
into an impaired river would violate the strict water quality standards of the river
as it entered Oklahoma.181
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit overturned the
EPA permit on the grounds that such discharges into impaired waters were
categorically prohibited.182 The United States Supreme Court reversed the Tenth
Circuit, stating: “The Court of Appeals construed the Clean Water Act to prohibit
any discharge of efﬂuent that would reach waters already in violation of existing
water quality standards. We ﬁnd nothing in the Act to support this reading.”183
The Court then discussed the relationship between discharges and the attainment
of water quality standards in that water body.
Although the Act contains several provisions directing
compliance with state water quality standards, the parties have
pointed to nothing that mandates a complete ban on discharges
into a waterway that is in violation of those standards. The
statute does, however, contain provisions designed to remedy
existing water quality violations and to allocate the burden of
reducing undesirable discharges between existing sources and
new sources. Thus, rather than establishing the categorical ban
announced by the Court of Appeals—which might frustrate
the construction of new plants that would improve existing
conditions—the Clean Water Act vests in the EPA and the States
broad authority to develop long-range, area-wide programs to
alleviate and eliminate existing pollution.184
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Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992).

180

Id. at 95.

181

Id.
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Oklahoma v. E.P.A., 908 F.2d 595 (10th Cir. 1990).

183

Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 107.

184

Id. at 108 (citations omitted).
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In brieﬁng to the Ninth Circuit in Pinto Creek, EPA and Carlota portrayed
the conservation groups’ argument as tantamount to the “categorical ban” rejected
by the Supreme Court in Arkansas. In the conservation groups’ administrative
appeal to the EAB, the EAB held that the groups’ interpretation of 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.4(i) “would perpetrate the very outcome [that] the Supreme Court in
[Arkansas] sought to avoid (adoption of a rigid approach that might frustrate the
construction of new facilities that would improve existing conditions).”185 The EAB
reasoned that “to agree with Petitioners would set in motion a ‘Catch-22’ whereby
[Pinto Creek] cannot get cleaner because it cannot become pristine enough for
Carlota to begin the [Gibson remediation].”186
The Ninth Circuit disagreed and reversed the EAB decision, ﬁnding no
conﬂict with Arkansas.187 Arkansas is distinguishable from Pinto Creek in several
ways.188 First and foremost, Arkansas did not involve new discharges and never
mentioned 40 C.F.R. §122.4(i).189 Further, restricting the issuance of new
discharge permits into impaired waters pending completion of a plan to remediate
excess pollution, as discussed in Pinto Creek, is not the type of “categorical ban”
discussed in Arkansas.190
185
In re Carlota, 11 E.A.D. 692, 766 (Sept. 30, 2004), available at http://www.epa.gov/eab/
disk11/carlota.pdf (emphasis added).
186

Id.

187

Pinto Creek, 504 F.3d at 1013–15.

188

At least one commentator had recognized the potential connections between §122.4(i)
and its prohibitions against dischargers into impaired waters and the Supreme Court’s decision in
Arkansas.
The EPA’s regulation [§ 122.4(i)] . . . provide[s] a reasonably strong argument
that a water’s 303(d) listing precludes new or revised NPDES permits that allow
additional pollution, although it is unclear what facts need to be demonstrated
to support the argument in any given case. However, the Supreme Court’s 1991
decision in Arkansas v. Oklahoma may suggest that this preclusionary rule is
inapplicable in any circumstance. In that decision, the Court rejected a circuit
court conclusion that the Act “prohibit[ed] any discharge of efﬂuent that would
reach waters already in violation of existing water quality standards.” The Court
concluded that the Act lacked any such prohibition. However, the Court did not
discuss or acknowledge the prohibition contained in 40 C.F.R. [§]122.4(i), or the
implied statutory prohibition underlying that regulation.
Michael M. Wenig, How ‘Total’ Are ‘Total Maximum Daily Loads’?—Legal Issues Regarding the Scope
of Watershed-Based Pollution Control Under the Clean Water Act, 12 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 87, 122 (1998)
(citations omitted).
189

As another commentator noted: “Among other things, the case dealt with ‘antidegradation’
requirements; the Supreme Court never mentioned, let alone discussed, the role of TMDLs and
section 122.4(i).” Jeffrey M. Gaba, New Sources, New Growth and the Clean Water Act, 55 ALA. L.
REV. 651, 668 n.101 (2004).
190
See Friends of the Wild Swan, Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1203 (D. Mont.
1999) (prohibiting EPA and the State of Montana from issuing new discharge permits into impaired
waters), aff ’d in relevant part, 74 Fed. Appx. 718, 724; 2003 WL 21751849, at *4 (9th Cir. 2003)
(discussing how the district court’s prohibition did not conﬂict with Arkansas).
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Arkansas also involved very different facts than Pinto Creek. In Arkansas, the
new pollution was so minimal that it could not even be measured—the discharge
“would not lead to a detectable change in water quality.”191 Because the discharge
in Arkansas would not affect water quality, the Court was reluctant to overturn
the EPA permit which allowed that discharge. Thus, the Court was correct in
ruling against “establishing a categorical ban” on such de minimis discharges.192
The Court’s statement against “frustrat[ing] the construction of new plants that
would improve existing conditions,” thus makes sense when viewed against the
facts of that case.193
In Pinto Creek, the situation at Carlota was markedly different. There,
Carlota proposed to discharge measurable and signiﬁcant amounts of copper into
Pinto Creek. Indeed, the TMDL was established to account for Carlota’s new
copper discharges.194 This is different from the undetectable and unmeasurable
discharges in Arkansas. In Pinto Creek, the Ninth Circuit held that requiring a
new discharger to meet the procedural requirements of 40 C.F.R. §122.4(i) is not
a “ban.”195 “This is not a complete ban but a requirement of schedules to meet the
objective of the Clean Water Act.”196
The Ninth Circuit held that without a plan to achieve water quality standards,
EPA cannot allow new discharges that will exacerbate the violations.197 However,
if such a plan is developed, the discharge may occur. The Ninth Circuit’s decision
requires EPA to review proposed discharges on a case-by-case basis, focusing on
the existing quality of the stream, the pollution levels in the proposed discharge,
and whether a plan exists to achieve the water quality standards based on other
pollution sources in the stream.198

E. Carlota’s Post-Merits Efforts to Overturn Pinto Creek and the EPA’s
Attempt to Avoid the Ramiﬁcations of the Ninth Circuit’s Decision
After the Ninth Circuit’s decision on the merits, Carlota ﬁled a petition for en
banc review. The EPA did not join in that petition, and the Ninth Circuit, without
discussion, denied the petition. Carlota then ﬁled a petition for certiorari with

191

Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 112; see also id. at 95–96 (noting that the proposed discharge would
not affect downstream water quality standards).
192

Id. at 108.

193

Id.

See generally U.S. E.P.A., TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD FOR COPPER IN PINTO CREEK,
ARIZONA, at 16 (2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/waters/tmdldocs/11700_11700.pdf.
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Pinto Creek, 504 F.3d at 1015.
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Id. at 1013.
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Id. at 1012.
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Id. at 1012–13.
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the United States Supreme Court.199 This time, EPA actively opposed Carlota’s
certiorari petition.200 Six separate amicus briefs were submitted in support of
Carlota’s petition.201
In its certiorari petition, Carlota argued that the Ninth Circuit’s decision
conﬂicted with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Arkansas, as well
as the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Annandale.202 Carlota argued that
the Ninth Circuit’s decision amounted to the “categorical ban” on discharges
into impaired waters rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Arkansas.203
Carlota also focused on the language in Arkansas that noted the EPA’s and States’
“broad authority to develop long-range, area-wide programs to alleviate and
eliminate existing pollution.”204
By focusing on the “long-range, area-wide programs,” Carlota was essentially
arguing that Arkansas validated the type of “offset” approach that had been at
issue in Pinto Creek. However, there was no mention of any “offset” in Arkansas,
and the issue of pollutant trading within a watershed never arose in that case.
The EPA’s opposition to Carlota’s certiorari petition refutes the notion
that Pinto Creek conﬂicts with Arkansas. In its response brief to the United
States Supreme Court, EPA concluded that “the decision [in Pinto Creek] does
not virtually or categorically prohibit the permitting of new sources or new
dischargers to impaired water bodies under the CWA, and there is no conﬂict
with Arkansas.”205
Instead, EPA focused on the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on the need for plans to
remediate existing pollution in impaired waters. According to EPA, Pinto Creek
“afﬁrmatively noted that EPA can use its broad discretion to establish priorities
among point sources and it can issue permits for new discharges, so long as there
are compliance schedules.”206
EPA’s response to Carlota’s claim that Pinto Creek conﬂicted with Annandale,
however, is more ambiguous and appears to signal EPA’s attempt to minimize
the Ninth Circuit’s rejection of the agency’s “offset” defense in Pinto Creek. In its

199

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 6.

200

Brief for Federal Respondent, supra note 8, at *21.

201

See supra note 7.

202

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 6, at *13–14.

203

Id.

204

Id. at *13 (quoting Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 108).

205

Brief for Federal Respondent, supra note 8, at *18.

206

Id. at *17.
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response to Carlota’s certiorari petition, EPA argued that the reason there was no
conﬂict with Annandale was because the Ninth Circuit’s decision “expressly turned
on the second sentence of the regulation [40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i)], which became
relevant because a TMDL had already been established for Pinto Creek.”207
Here, EPA attempted to downplay the Ninth Circuit’s holding that “[T]here
is nothing in the Clean Water Act or the regulation that provides an exception
for an offset when the waters remain impaired and the new source is discharging
pollution into that impaired water.”208 EPA argued that this holding was just
a “passing statement” regarding the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the ﬁrst
sentence of 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i), and that the Ninth Circuit’s holding was “itself
ambiguous.”209 The ﬁrst sentence of 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i) states that “No permit
may be issued . . . To a new source or a new discharger, if the discharge from its
construction or operation will cause or contribute to the violation of water quality
standards.”210
In an effort to defend its interpretation of its “offset” defense, EPA argued
that the Ninth Circuit did not rule on whether a new discharger could avoid the
prohibition against “causing or contributing” to a violation of a water quality
standard by creating an “offset” somewhere in the same watershed.211 EPA stated:
The Ninth Circuit’s passing observation that the CWA and
regulations do not contain an “exception for an offset” is itself
ambiguous. The court may simply have meant that there is
no express provision in the CWA or regulations that in terms
provides an “exception” in situations involving an “offset.” If
so, the court’s conclusion was correct but ultimately irrelevant.
Whether the phrase that does appear in the ﬁrst sentence of
Section 122.4(i) (i.e., “will cause or contribute to the violation
of water quality standards”) is properly construed to be met
where there will be an offset is a different question, which the
Ninth Circuit did not address. Indeed, elsewhere in its decision
the court appeared to contemplate that any offset created by
remediation of the Gibson Mine could be taken into account.212

207
Id. at *14 n.4. EPA noted that a TMDL had not been established for the receiving waters
in Annandale.
208

Pinto Creek, 504 F.3d at 1012.

209

Brief for Federal Respondent, supra note 8, at *15 n.4.
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40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i).
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Brief for Federal Respondent, supra note 8, at *15 n.4.
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Id. (citing Pinto Creek, 504 F.3d at 1016).
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Notably, in its reply brief to the United States Supreme Court in support of its
certiorari petition, Carlota strongly disagreed with EPA, stating that: “Contrary
to the [EPA]’s argument, the Ninth Circuit held that the ﬁrst sentence of the
regulation prohibits discharges subject to offset conditions, and its analysis,
although terse, was a holding and not dictum.”213
Despite the clear language from the Ninth Circuit, EPA’s argument to the
United States Supreme Court indicated the agency’s attempt to keep alive its
“offset” and trading policy that it has been trying to implement for over a decade.214
However, such an open-ended policy cannot survive Pinto Creek. Indeed, in its
reply brief in support of its petition for certiorari, Carlota acknowledged that the
EPA’s “offset” policy does not comport with the court’s decision. “[T]he court
plainly rejected the EPA’s ‘contention’ that Carlota’s discharge does not ‘contribute
to’ violations because of the ‘offset’ condition, stating that the ﬁrst sentence [of 40
C.F.R. § 122.4(i)] contains no ‘exception’ for an offset.”215
Although it is understandable that EPA would want to continue to defend
its “offset” and trading policies, such a defense does not comport with the rule
established in Pinto Creek. As noted above, EPA argued that, based on the “offset”
from the partial remediation of the upstream Gibson mine, the new permit’s
copper discharges (which were, on paper, less than the amount of copper to be
removed from the watershed by the Gibson mine cleanup) did not “cause or
contribute” to a violation of the copper standard at the new Carlota site.216 Both
EPA and Carlota had argued, and the EPA’s Environmental Appeals Board had
held, that the ﬁrst sentence of 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i)’s prohibition against “causing
or contributing” could be satisﬁed by an “offset.” The EAB paraphrased EPA’s
argument:
In [EPA]’s view Carlota will not cause or contribute to the
violation of water quality standards but rather will improve
existing conditions because the reductions that will result from
its activities are greater than the projected discharges [from the
new Carlota mine]. According to [EPA], Carlota’s permit would
result in a net condition in the total load of copper delivered to
Pinto Creek and that sufﬁces to meet the ﬁrst sentence of section
122.4(i).217
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Petitioner’s Reply Brief, Carlota Copper Co. v. Friends of Pinto Creek, 129 S. Ct. 896
(2008) (No. 07-1524), 2008 WL 4263548, at *2 (Sept. 15, 2008).
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See supra notes 128–34 and accompanying text (regarding EPA’s trading and offset policies).
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Petitioner’s Reply Brief, supra note 213, at *3.
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See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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In re Carlota, 11 E.A.D. at 767.
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The EAB ratiﬁed this argument, agreeing with the EPA permit writers that the
requirement of an “offset” in the NPDES permit satisﬁes the ﬁrst sentence of 40
C.F.R. § 122.4(i).218
However, as detailed above, the Ninth Circuit ﬂatly rejected this assertion.219
Pinto Creek holds that the presence of an “offset” of the pollutant loading from the
new source, absent a plan (i.e., compliance schedules) to bring the other sources of
pollutant-loading down to the level at which the stream will achieve water quality
standards, does not satisfy the strict requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i).220
This means that in addition to requiring a plan for the “offset” or “trade”
of the pollutant loading to be discharged by the new source, the new discharger
must show there is a plan in place to reduce the pollutant loading from all the
water pollution discharges into that impaired water body. Depending on the size
of the watershed and the number and scope of the discharges contributing to the
impairment of the water body, meeting this requirement may prove very difﬁcult.

CONCLUSION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Pinto
Creek has broad ramiﬁcations for the regulation of pollution discharges into
the nation’s waters. The Clean Water Act’s recognition of the need to protect
impaired waters, and indeed “restore” their health, had long been a neglected
and overlooked requirement. This is no longer the case, as the directive from
Pinto Creek is clear. New pollutant discharges into impaired waters are no longer
allowed, absent a speciﬁc plan to lower the pollutant loading from all the existing
sources, so that the stream may achieve its water quality standards.
Until Pinto Creek, the establishment of TMDLs for impaired waters––while
sometimes a useful tool for analyzing potential means to reduce pollutant
loadings––was essentially a non-enforceable exercise in water quality planning.
Pinto Creek has changed the calculus of TMDLs. No longer are TMDLs “paper
tigers.” After the court’s decision in Pinto Creek, EPA and the states must now
ensure that the loading reductions contained in TMDLs become part and parcel
of any new discharge permits into that watershed. While the loading reductions
contained in TMDLs are still not “self-implementing,” EPA and the states cannot
issue new discharge permits for impaired waters without a plan in place to bring
that impaired water back to health.

218

Id. at 767–68.

219
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Although the implementation of the rule established in Pinto Creek may be
initially resisted by EPA and the states (as evidenced by EPA’s brieﬁng to the
Supreme Court in the case) in the long run, Pinto Creek represents an important
step towards fulﬁlling Congress’ goal in enacting the modern Clean Water Act in
1972—to “restore and maintain . . . the integrity of the nation’s waters.”221

221

33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006).
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